Controversies in Game Theory

The mini-course "Controversies in Game Theory X: Learning and Erring in Games" consists of five course units that provide an in-depth introduction to issues in game theory motivated by real-world issues related to the tensions that may result from interactions in groups, where individual and collective interests may conflict. The course, organized by ETH Computational Social Science and UZH Sociology, brings together various strands of game theory research spanning social sciences and computer science, with focus on the theory of learning in games with applications in various disciplines.

Important: Course material is intended for personal use in the context of this course only; redistributing, citing or publishing any of the material is strictly prohibited. If prompted, please enter your ETH username and password to download course materials.

Course Info: Course dates are from Monday 28.05 to Friday 31.05. More detailed information about the course may be found in the Course Catalogue here or in the Poster protected pageherelock.

Schedule and Course Material: The daily structure of the course is as follows:
• 09.15-10.45: Talk 1: an introduction to the topic of the day
• 10.45-11.15: Break
• 11.15-12.45: Talk 2: recent research on the topic

See below for detailed information about talks and course materials. 

Room: ML H 37.1

The course delivery consists of a graded course project, details of which will be provided during the first session on Wednesday, which starts 9:15 promptly!


Suggested literature:
- K Binmore, Fun and games, a text on game theory, 1994, Great Source Education
- SR Chakravarty, M Mitra and P Sarkar, A Course on Cooperative Game Theory, 2015, Cambridge University Press
- H. Gintis: Game Theory Evolving
- MJ Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, 2004, Oxford University Press New York
- J Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 1951, Annals of Mathematics
- JW Weibull, Evolutionary game theory, 1997, MIT Press
- HP Young, Strategic Learning and Its Limits, 2004, Oxford University Press
- A Diekmann, Spieltheorie: Einführung, Beispiele, Experimente, 2009, Rowolth
- J. Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

Suggested readings for projects:

1. by Dirk Helbing:

- J. Hofbauer and Karl Sigmund: Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- H. Gintis: Game Theory Evolving
- D. Helbing: Quantitative Sociodynamics
- D. Helbing: Social Self-Organization
- D. Helbing: A stochastic behavioral model and a ‚microscopic‘ foundation of evolutionary game theory
- D. Helbing, M. Schönhof, H.-U. Stark, and J.A. Holyst: How individuals learn to take turns…
- D. Helbing and S. Lozano: Phase transitions to cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
- D. Helbing and A. Johansson: Cooperation, norms, and revolutions…
- D. Helbing and T. Platkowski: Drift- or fluctuation-induced ordering and self-organization in driven many-particle systems
- D. Helbing and W. Yu: Migration as mechanism to promote cooperation
- D. Helbing, A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, and G. Szabo: Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards…
- T. Grund, C. Waloszek, and D. Helbing: How natural selection can create both self- and other-regarding preferences and networked minds
- D. Helbing: Economics 2.0: The natural step towards a self-regulating, participatory market economy
- D. Helbing and A. Johansson: Pedestrian, crowd and evacuation dynamics
- S. Hoogendoorn and P.H.L. Bovy: Simulation of pedestrian flows by optimal control and differential games- D. Helbing et al. An Analytical Theory of Traffic Flow (collection of research articles)
- D. Helbing and S. Lämmer: Supply and Production Networks...

2. by Heinrich Nax:

Game theory classics:
- Zur theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele by J. v.Neumann
- Nash's PhD thesis

On matching:
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage by D. Gale and L. S. Shapley
- Two-sided matching by A. Roth and M. Sotomayor (textbook)
- Random paths to stability in two-sided matching by A. Roth and J. Vande Vate
- Papers presented by Bary Pradelski (see Friday session)

On behavioral game theory:
- Progress in Behavioral Game Theory by C. Camerer (survey)
- Learning and the economics of small decisions by I. Erev and E. Haruvy (generalized RL from the psychology perspective)

Own research on best-response dynamics:
- A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games with M. Maes
- What noise matters? Experimental evidence for stochastic deviations in social norms with E. Bilancini and L. Boncinelli

AGT:
- Worst-case equilibria by E. Koutsoupias and C. Papadimitriou
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium by C. Daskalakis, P. Goldberg and C. Papadimitriou